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 SUMMARY  
The significant increase in the volume, variety and velocity of data complicates cloud forensic efforts, as 
such big data will, at some point, become computationally expensive to be fully extracted and analyzed in a 
timely manner. Thus, it is important for a digital forensic practitioner to have a well-rounded knowledge 
about the most relevant data artefacts that could be forensically recovered from the cloud product under 
investigation. In this paper, CloudMe, a popular cloud storage service, is studied. The types and locations 
of the artefacts relating to the installation and uninstallation of the client application, logging in and out, 
and file synchronization events from the computer desktop and mobile clients are described. Findings from 
this research will pave the way towards the development of tools and techniques (e.g. data mining 
techniques) for cloud-enabled big data endpoint forensics investigation.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
With continuing advances in broadband and pervasive media devices (e.g., smartphones and tablets), it is 
not uncommon to find the storage media in consumer devices to contain Terabytes (TB) of data. Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI)’s 15 Regional Computer Forensic Laboratories, for example, reported that 
the average amount of data they processed in 2014 is 22.10 times the amount of data ten years ago, up from 
22TB to 5060TB [1], [2]. The increase in storage capacity has a direct impact on cloud forensics and 
operational investigations; hence, it is inevitable that big data solutions will become an integral part of 
cloud forensics [3]. 
Due to the nature of cloud-enabled big data storage solutions, identification of forensic artefacts from the 
cloud hosting environment may be analogous to ‘finding a needle in a haystack’ [4]. The data could be 
segregated across multiple servers via virtualization [5]. Due to the lack of physical access to the cloud 
hosting environment, forensic examiners may need to rely on the Cloud Service Provider (CSP) for 
preservation of evidence at a lower level of abstraction. This may, however, not be viable due to service 
level agreements (SLAs) between a CSP and its users [6]–[14]. Even if the location of the data could be 
identified, traditional practices and approaches to computer forensic investigation are unlikely to be 
adequate [9]. For example, existing digital forensic practices generally require a bit-by-bit copy of an entire 
storage media [15]–[17], which is unrealistic and expensive on a large-scale dataset [12]. It has been 
demonstrated that it could take more than 9 hours to merely acquire 30GB of data from an Infrastructure as 
a Service (IaaS) cloud environment [18], [19]. Hence, the time required to acquire a significantly larger 
dataset could be considerably longer. These challenges are compounded in cross-jurisdictional 
investigations, which could prohibit the transfer of evidential data due to the lack of cross-nation legislative 
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agreements in place [16], [20]–[26]. Therefore, it is unsurprising that forensic analysis of cloud service 
endpoints remains an area of research interest [23], [27]–[33]. 
CloudMe (previously known as ‘iCloud’) is a Software as a Service (SaaS) cloud model currently owned 
and operated by Xcerion [34]. The free version of CloudMe offers up to 19 GB storage space (with referral 
program), and its premium version offers up to 500 GB storage space for individual users and 5 TB for 
business users [35]. CloudMe users may share contents with each other, as well as other public users, 
through email, text-messaging, Facebook and Google sharing. There are three modes of sharing in 
CloudMe, namely: WebShare, WebShare+, and Collaborate. WebShare only permits one-way sharing, 
where the recipients are not allowed to make changes to the shared folder. WebShare+ allows users to 
upload files/folders only, while collaborative sharing allows the recipients to add, edit or delete the content, 
even without the use of CloudMe client application [36]. The service can be accessed using the web User 
Interface (UI) as an Internet file system or the client applications, which are available for Microsoft 
Windows, Linux, Mac OSX, Android, iOS, Google TV, Samsung Smart TV, Western Digital TV, 
Windows Storage Servers, Novell’s Dynamic File Services Suite, Novosoft Handy Backup etc. CloudMe is 
also compatible with third-party software and Internet services, enabling file compression, encryption, 
document viewing, video and music streaming etc. through the web/client applications [36]. 
In this paper, we seek to identify, collect, preserve, and analyze residual artefacts after using CloudMe 
cloud storage service on a range of end-point devices, as these devices are typically available to forensic 
investigators. Evidence recovered from these end-point devices could also be used to inform further 
investigation in a big data environment. The questions we seek to answer in this research are as follows:  
1. What residual artefacts remain on the hard drive and physical memory after a user has used 
CloudMe desktop client application, and web application? 
2. Where are such data remnants located on a Windows, Ubuntu, and Mac OS client device? 
3. What Cloudme residual artefacts remain on the internal memory, and where are such data remnants 
located on an Android and iOS client device? 
The structure of this paper is as follows. In the next section, we describe related work.  Section 3 
describes the experiment environment setup. In Section 4, we discuss the traces from the storage media and 
physical memory dumps of the desktop clients. Section 5 presents the findings from mobile clients and 
network traffic, respectively. Finally, we conclude the paper and outline potential future research areas in 
Section 6.  
2. RELATED WORK 
The National Institute of Standard and Technology (NIST) defines cloud computing as  
[a] model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of 
configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications, and services) that can 
be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management effort or service provider interaction” 
[37].  
The key aspects are to provide on-demand self-service, broad network access, resource pooling, rapid 
edacity, and measured services. There are three cloud computing service models [37], namely: Software as 
a Service (SaaS), Platform as a Service (PaaS), and Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS). NIST [37] also 
defined four deployment models as part of the cloud computing definition, which are public, private, 
community, and hybrid clouds. The public cloud is owned and operated by a provider organization. Users 
can subscribe to the service for a fee, based on the storage or bandwidth usage. On the other hand, the 
private cloud is tailored to a single organization’s needs. The cloud infrastructure that is administered by 
organizations sharing common concerns (e.g., mission, security requirements, policy, and compliance 
considerations) are called community cloud.  
Cloud computing is not without its own unique forensics challenges [39]. Jurisdiction differences, loss of 
data control, physical inaccessibility of evidences, multi-tenancy, and lack of tools for large scale 
distributed and virtualized systems are often cited as key cloud forensic challenges [40]–[43]. Other related 
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challenges include diverse range and types of digital media storage, decentralization, and utilization of anti-
forensic and encryption techniques [42], [44], [45]. For example, Fahdi et al. [46] found that the top three 
cloud forensic challenges according to digital forensic practitioners are volume of data, legal aspect, and 
time, while the top three challenges raised by digital forensic researchers are time, volume of data, and 
automation of forensic analysis.  
In the review of the 2011 Australian Federal Government’s Cybercrime Bill amendment on mutual legal 
assistance requests, Hooper et al.[24] concluded that laws amendment in a single jurisdiction is unlikely to 
be adequate in addressing multi-jurisdiction investigation issues, such as in cloud computing environments. 
Martini and Choo [7], Taylor et at. [47], and Daryabar et al. [9] echoed the need for harmonize relevant 
legislation across jurisdictions, although realistically it is challenging due to the different judicial and legal 
systems internationally. Simou et al. [42] and Pichan et al. [43] added that our dependence on CSP also 
compound the challenges in all stages of cloud forensics (e.g., identify, preserve, analyze, and report [48], 
[49]). Therefore, Farina et al. [50] and Damshenas et al. [3], [11] suggested mitigating such limitations 
through clearly-defined Service Level Agreements (SLA) between CPSs and users. 
Martini and Choo [51] proposed the first cloud forensic investigation framework, which was derived 
based upon the frameworks of McKemmish [52] and NIST [49]. The framework was used to investigate 
ownCloud [53], Amazon EC2 [18], VMWare [54], and XtreemFS [55]. Quick et al. [23] extended and 
validated the four-stage framework using SkyDrive, Dropbox, Google Drive, and ownCloud. Chung et al. 
[56] proposed a methodology for cloud investigation on Windows, Mac OSX, iOS, and Android devices. 
The methodology was then used to investigate Amazon S3, Google Docs, and Evernote. Scanlon et al. [57] 
outlined a methodology for remote acquisition of evidences from decentralized file synchronization 
networks and utilized it to investigate BitTorrent Sync [58]. In another study, Teing et al. [27] proposed a 
methodology to investigate the BitTorrent Sync application (version 2.0) or any third party and Original 
Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) applications. Do et al. [59] proposed an adversary model for digital 
forensics and demonstrated how such an adversary model can be used to investigate mobile devices (e.g. 
Android smartwatch –  Do et al. [60] and apps). Ab Rahman et al. [61] proposed a conceptual forensic-by-
design framework to integrate forensics tools and best practices in the design and development of cloud 
systems.  
Marty [62] and Shields et al. [63] proposed a proactive application-level logging mechanism designed to 
log information of forensics interest. However, Zawoad and Hasan [64] argued that the proposed solutions 
may not be viable in real world scenarios. Forensic researchers such as Dykstra and Sherman [65], 
Gebhardt and Reiser [66], Quick et al. [23], and Martini and Choo [54], on the other hand, presented 
methods and prototype implementations to support the (remote) collection of evidential materials using 
Application Programming Interfaces (API). Quick and Choo [67] and Teing et al. [29] studied the integrity 
of data downloaded from the web and desktop clients of Dropbox, Google Drive, Skydrive, and Symform 
and determined that the act of downloading files from client applications does not breach the evidence 
integrity (e.g., no change in the hash values), despite changes in file creation/modification time.  
In addition to remote collection of evidences, scholars also studied the potential of on-device collection 
of cloud artefacts such as from Evernote [56], Amazon S3 [56], Dropbox [33], [56], Google Drive [31], 
[56], Microsoft Skydrive [32], Amazon Cloud Drive [68], BitTorrent Sync [27], [69], SugarSync [70], 
Ubuntu One [30], huBic [71], Mega [72], Syncany [28], SpiderOak, JustCloud, pCloud [73], as well as 
different mobile cloud apps [20], [74]. Quick and Choo [31]–[33] also determined that data erasing tools 
such as Eraser and CCleaner may not completely remove the data remnants from Dropbox, Google Drive, 
and Microsoft SkyDrive.  We are not aware of any published research focusing on forensic investigation of 
CloudMe SaaS cloud, and this is the gap we aim to contribute to in this research.  
3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
We adopted the research methodology of Quick and Choo [31]–[33] and Teing et al. [16], [26]–[29] in the 
design of our experiments. The first step was to set up the test environments for the desktop and mobile 
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clients. The desktop environment consisted of three Virtual Machines (VMs) with following 
configurations: 
 Windows 8.1 Professional (Service Pack 1, 64-bit, build 9600) with 2GB RAM and 20GB hard drive. 
 Ubuntu 14.04.1 LTS with 1GB RAM and 20GB hard disk. 
 Mac OS X Mavericks 10.9.5 with 1GB RAM and 60GB hard drive.  
The VMs were hosted using VMware Fusion Professional version 7.0.0 (2103067) on a Macbook Pro 
running Mac OS X Mavericks 10.9.5, with a 2.6GHz Intel Core i7 processor and 16GB of RAM. As noted 
by Quick and Choo [31]–[33], it would have been laborious to replicate the experimental environment 
setup on a physical workstation. The client mobile devices comprised a factory restored iPhone 4 running 
iOS 7.1.2 and an HTC One X running Android KitKat 4.4.4, which were jailbroken/rooted with ‘Pangu8 
Version 1.1’ and ‘Odin3 Version 185’ (respectively) to enable root access to the user’s partition. We then 
created a set of sample files for the file transfer experiments, which consisted of copies of  
the 3111
th
 email message of the Berkeley Enron email dataset (downloaded from http://bailando.sims.berke
ley.edu/enron_email.html) that were saved in .RTF, .TXT, .DOCX, .JPG (print screen), .ZIP, and .PDF 
formats. This provides a basis for replicating the experiment in future.  
Similar to previous studies [29], [32], [70], [75], the fourth step of the methodology involved conducting 
a predefined set of experiments such as installation and uninstallation of the CloudMe client applications as 
well as uploading, downloading, viewing, deleting, unsyncing, sharing, and inactivating sync files/folders 
to simulate various real world scenarios of using the CloudMe desktop, mobile, and web applications. The 
web application was accessed using the Google Chrome client for Windows version 51.0.2704.103m. 
Before each experiment, we made a base snapshot of each VM workstation to serve as the control case. 
After each experiment, we created a snapshot of the VM workstations before taking a copy of the virtual 
memory and disk file (after system’s shutdown) in bit-stream (dd) and Encase Evidence (E01) formats, 
respectively. It was considered that undertaking analysis on the virtual memory (.VMEM) and disk 
(.VMDK) file would prevent the memory/image acquisition tools from altering the data in the storage 
media and physical memory [31]–[33]. As for the mobile clients, we made binary images using ’dd’ over 
SSH/ADB Shell. 
In the fifth step, we set up a forensic workstation with the tools in Table I. We then collected data 
relevant to the CloudMe investigation in the sixth step, before analysing the data in the seventh step. In the 
former, we extracted data that matched the terms ‘cloudme’, ‘xcerion, and ‘Enron3111′ from the forensic 
images for analysis using the tools of relevance in the latter. These included SQLite database files, PLIST 
files, prefetch files, event logs, shortcuts, thumbnail cache, $MFT, $LogFile, $UsnJrnl, as well as web 
browser files (e.g., in 
%AppData%\Local\Google, %AppData%\Local\Microsoft\Windows\WebCache, %AppData%\Roaming\M
ozilla, %AppData%\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Files\index.dat). The artefacts from the physical 
memory dump were collected using Volatility, Photorec file carver, and HxD Hex Editor; network traffic 
using Wireshark and NetMiner. For all the data collected, both MD5 and SHA1 hash values were 
calculated and subsequently verified. All experiments were repeated thrice (at different dates) to ensure 
consistency of findings.  
4. CLOUDME ANALYSIS ON DESKTOP CLIENTS 
The installation of the CloudMe desktop clients created the data directory at %AppData%\Local\CloudMe, 
/home/<User Profile>/.local/share/CloudMe,  /Users/<User Profile>/Library/Application 
Support/CloudMe on the Windows, Ubuntu, and Mac OS desktop clients. The sync (download) folders 
were located in the OS’ Documents directory, such as %Users%\[User Profile]\Documents, /home/[User 
Profile]/Documents, /User/[User Profile]/Documents/ on the Windows, Ubuntu and Mac OS clients by 
default. When the sync folders with the option "When delete folder in the cloud and all its content is 
selected." in the client applications were deleted, we observed that the sync folders remained locally but 
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were removed completely from the server. In all scenarios, the data and download directories remained 
after uninstallation of the client applications. 
4.1 Cache.db Database 
The file synchronization metadata and cloud transaction records could be predominantly located in the 
/%CloudMe%/cache.db database (in the data directory). The tables of forensic interest are ‘user_table’, 
‘syncfolder_table’, ‘syncfolder_folder_table’, and ‘syncfolder_document_table’. The ‘user_table’ holds the 
property information of users who had logged in from the desktop client applications; ‘syncfolder_table’ 
maintains a list of metadata associated with the sync folder(s) added by or download to the local device; 
‘syncfolder_folder_table’ keeps track of the tree structure for the sync folder(s); and 
‘syncfolder_document_table’ records the metadata associated with the synced files in the sync folder(s). 
Table columns of forensic interest are presented in Table II. 
To construct a meaningful file synchronisation timeline, we threaded the data fields in the four tables to 
provide the information such as: Which are the synced files? Where are the locations? Who is the owner of 
the files? What time was the files created? What is the last sync time. Error! Reference source not found. 
shows the SQL query used to parse Cache.db and produce synchronization history shown in Error! 
Reference source not found..  
4.2 CloudMe Registry, Sync.conf, and com.CloudMe.Sync.plist Files 
Examination of the Windows registry revealed the username for the currently logged in user and the device 
name in HKEY_USERS\<SID>\Software\CloudMe\Sync\startup\me 
and HKEY_USERS\<SID>\Software\CloudMe\Sync\<Username>\_xClientId (respectively). The username 
can be a useful identifying information for the cache.db database’s remnants i.e., locating copies of the 
‘user_table’ data in physical memory dumps. The client ID is a unique 32-character alphanumeric string 
used to identify a CloudMe device, which can be used to correlate residual evidences. 
In Ubuntu client, both username and clientID were located in the /home/<User 
Profile>/.config/CloudMe/Sync.conf file, by looking at values for entries ‘me’ (of the ‘startup’ property) 
and ‘_xClientId’ (of the 'Username' property) respectively. In the Mac OSX client, Username and ClientID 
were located in the ‘startup.me’ and ‘[Username].xClientId’ properties of the 
/Users/<User Profile>/Library/Preferences/com.CloudMe.Sync.plist file. 
4.3 Cloudme Log Files 
Log files play a vital role in an incident investigation [13]. The CloudMe log files are located in the ‘logs’ 
subdirectory and created daily and named as [Year-Month-Day].txt. Although the log file only recorded 
application errors,  it was possible to identify the file synchronization time alongside the sync path from the 
log entries such as 
“2016-03-15 14:52:02: CloudMeUnthreaded: Request error: "/Users/alice/Documents/UbuntuShareFolder
/UbuntuSubFolder/UbuntuSubFolder/Enron3111.docx"  |  "Error downloading https://os.cloudme.com/v1/
users/12886417622/favorites/112112/webshare/UbuntuSubFolder/UbuntuSubFolder/Enron3111.docx - 
server replied: Not Found"  Error number:  203”, “2016-03-15 14:56:30: onSyncRequestFailed:  
"WindowsSubFolder/WindowsSubFolder/Enron3111.pdf"  | Type: "Uploading"  |  Error:  "7"”, “2016-03-
15 14:56:30: SYNC_FILE_NOT_FOUND—
SYNC_FOLDER_NOT_FOUND: ( 0 )  "WindowsSubFolder/WindowsSubFolder/Enron3111.pdf" :” and “2
016-03-15 14:51:52: addRemoveLocalFolder:Fail:  "/home/suspectpc/UbuntuSyncFolder/UbuntuSubFolder
"”. We could also recover the login time alongside the logged in username from the log entry “2016-03-15 
13:48:22: Logged in as: "adamthomson"”. 
4.4 Web Browser Artefacts 
Web browsing activities history is a critical source of evidence [29], [31]–[33], [53]. Our analysis of the 
web browsing history found unique identifying URLs associated with the user actions. For example, when 
accessing a sync folder in the CloudMe web application, we observed following URLs: 
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 https://www.cloudme.com/en#files:/Documents/<Folder name>, 
 https://www.cloudme.com/en#files:/f:<Folder ID>, 
 https://www.cloudme.com/en#sync:/f: <Folder ID>, 
 https://www.cloudme.com/en#sync:/<Folder ID>, and 
 https://www.cloudme.com/en#sync:/f:<Folder ID>, <Folder name>.  
Accessing or downloaded a sync file produced following URL: 
 https://www.cloudme.com/v1/documents/<Folder ID>/<Document ID>/1/<Filename>. 
When we accessed the folders shared with other users, we observed the following URL: 
 
https://www.cloudme.com/en#webshares:/<Folder name>. 
Accessing the folder shared by other users produced the URL:  
 https://www.cloudme.com/en#following:/<Folder name> 
The download URL for the shared file could be discerned from: 
 https://www.cloudme.com/v1/documents/<Folder ID>/<Document ID>/1/<Filename>?dl=<Filena
me>. 
The web client’s logout action generated from the following URL: 
 https://www.cloudme.com/en?r=1458192365602&logout=1.  
Rebuilding the web browsing caches produced the root directory for the web application at 
www.cloudme.com/v1. In particular, within the /%v1%/folders directory, we recovered a list of metadata 
files for the sync folders accessed by the user, which could be differentiated by the folder ID. Error! 
Reference source not found. illustrates the metadata information associated with the sync folders; each of 
which creates a ‘folder’ subtag to house the folder ID and name, and a ‘tag’ subtag to hold the folder 
sharing information such as the webshare ID and folder sharing type i.e., in the ‘group’ property. 
A search for the filenames of the sample files recovered files viewed on the web application in cache at 
/%v1%/documents/<Folder ID>/<Document ID>/1/. We also recovered thumbnails for the viewed files in 
/%v1%/documents/<Folder ID>/<Document ID>/<Thumbnail ID>. Notice that the /%v1%/documents 
directory will always contain at least one folder i.e., holding the metadata files associated with the sync 
devices at /%v1%/documents/<Folder ID>/<Document ID for device-specific metadata file>\1. Error! 
Reference source not found. shows the recovered device name and client ID from the ‘dName’ and 
‘clientId’ properties of the ‘sync’ tag in the metadata file. Each sync folder creates a ‘syncfolder’ subtag to 
define the folder name, directory path, folder ID, last sync time, and information about whether the sync 
folder has been synchronised and if it is a favourite folder in the ‘name’, path’, ‘folderId,’ lastSync’, 
‘hasSynchronized’, and ‘favoriteFolder’ properties respectively. 
 Another directory of interest within the ‘v1’ directory is the user-specific %v1%\users\<User ID> 
directory, which maintains a list of OpenSearch [72] description documents containing a wealth of folder 
metadata of forensic interest about the sync folders 
[73]. For example, the %v1%/users/<User ID>/favorites/extended=true&order=favoritename&count=100
0&offset=0&_=1458191.xml document holds the OpenSearch description for the favourite folders. The 
metadata of interest recovered from this document include the folder IDs, folder names, folder sharing 
passwords, webshare IDs, as well as usernames and user IDs for the favourite folders in the ‘folder_id’, 
‘name’, ‘password’, ‘webShareId’, sharingUserId’, ‘sharingUserName’ properties of the sync folder/file-
specific ‘favorite’ subtags (see Error! Reference source not found.). The 
%v1%/users/<User ID>/webshares/order=name&desc=false&count=1000&offset=0&resources=true&_
=145.xml document defines the OpenSearch property of the shared folders/files, such as the update time, 
creation time, passwords, creators’ IDs, webshare IDs in the ‘updated’, created’, ‘password’, ‘userId’, and 
‘id’ properties of the sync folder/file-specific ‘webshare’ subtags. The folder name and ID could be 
discerned from the ‘name’ and ‘id’ properties of the ‘folder’ subtag (see Error! Reference source not 
found.). Further details of the folder/file sharing could be located in the %v1%/users/<User ID>/lifestream 
document, such as the senders’ user ID, senders’ group ID, senders’ username, receivers’ user ID, 
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receivers’ group ID, receiver’s username, favourite IDs (for favourite folders), and whether the sharing has 
been seen in the ‘senderId’, ‘senderGroupId’, ‘senderName’, ‘receiverId’, ‘receiverGroupId’, 
‘receiverName’, ‘parentFolder’, and ‘seen’ properties in the ‘event’ subtags. 
4.5 Physical Memory Analysis 
For all investigated client applications, analysis of the physical memory dumps using the ‘pslist’ function 
of Volatility resulted in the recovery of the process name, process identifier (PID), parent process 
identifiers (PPID), and process initiation time (which echoed the observation of [16]). We determined that 
the CloudMe process could be differentiated using the process names ‘CloudMe.exe’, ‘cloudme-sync’ and 
‘CloudMe’ on the Windows, Ubuntu and Mac OS clients, respectively.  
Undertaking data carving of the memory image of the CloudMe process determined that the files of 
forensic interest such as cache.db, sync.config, and CloudMe logs could be recovered. When CloudMe was 
accessed using the web client, we recovered copies of the OpenSearch description documents containing 
the folder sharing passwords from the web browser’s memory space intact. Unsurprisingly, we also 
recovered copies of the database, configuration, and log files in plain text. For the cache database, a search 
for the username for the user located the data [74] of the ‘user_table’, which holds the user ID in the row 
ID variant field of the cell header section [74] in hex format.  Once the user ID is identified, a practitioner 
may locate the file offsets contained between the cell data section of the ‘syncfolder_document_table’, 
‘syncfolder_folder_table’ and ‘syncfolder_table’ tables, and work backwards to read the header field type 
varints [74] to recover the remaining data fields. 
5. CLOUDME ANALYSIS ON MOBILE CLIENTS 
Our examinations of the CloudMe mobile clients determined that the data directory is located in 
/private/var/mobile/Applications/<Universally Unique Identifier (UUID) for the CloudMe iOS app>/ and 
/data/data/com.excerion.android on the iOS and Android clients. Although the mobile clients did not keep 
a copy of the sync folders from the user’s account (like the desktop clients), it was possible to recover 
copies of the viewed files from %<Universally Unique Identifier (UUID) for the CloudMe iOS 
app>%/Documents/persistentCache/ and 
/storage/sdcard0/Android/data/com.xcerion.android/cache/files/Downloads/ of the iOS and Android clients 
by default.  
5.1 com.xcerion.icloud.iphone.plist and user_data.xml Files 
A closer examination of the files in the directory listings located the username and password in plaintext in 
the ‘username’ and ‘password’ properties of the %<Universally Unique Identifier (UUID) for the CloudMe 
iOS app>%/Library/Preferences/com.xcerion.icloud.iphone.plist and 
%com.excerion.android%/shared_prefs/user_data.xml files. The former also held the last upload time in 
datetime format in the ‘<username_LastUploadTime>’ property. 
5.2 db.sdb Database 
Analysis of the Android client revealed the cache database at 
/storage/sdcard0/Android/data/com.xcerion.android/cache/db.sdb. The tables of interest with the cache 
database are ‘files’ and ‘folders’. The ‘files’ table maintains a list of metadata of the sync files viewed by 
the user, while the ‘folders’ table  holds the metadata of the sync folders associated with the user’s account. 
db.sdb Database shows the table fields of interest from the db.sdb database. We also proposed using a SQL 
query to thread the table fields of interest from the tables to present the records in a forensically-friendly 
format as shown in Error! Reference source not found.. 
 
5.3 Cache.db Database 
Further examination of the iOS client recovered copies of the responses for the web API 
queries in the %<Universally Unique Identifier (UUID) for the CloudMe iOS app>%/Library/Caches/com.
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xcerion.icloud.iphone/nsurlcache/Cache.db database. Specifically, we located the cached items in the 
‘receiver_data’ table column of the cfurl_cache_receiver_data table in Binary Large OBject (BLOB) 
including metadata files and OpenSearch documents for the sync folders. Within the cfurl_cache_response 
table, we located the corresponding URLs and timestamps in datetime 
format, in the “request_key” and “time_stamp” table columns, respectively.  By threading the data fields us
ing the SQL query “SELECT cfurl_cache_receiver_data.receiver_data, cfurl_cache_response.request_key,
 cfurl_cache_response.time_stamp FROM cfurl_cache_receiver_data, cfurl_cache_response WHERE cfurl
_cache_receiver_data.entry_ID=cfurl_cache_response.entry_ID”, it was possible to correlate the cached 
items with the URLs and timestamps.  
6. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
In this paper, we examined the client residual artefacts left by CloudMe SaaS cloud as a backbone for big 
data storage. Our research included installing the client applications as well as uploading, downloading, 
deleting, sharing and activating/inactivating the sync folders/files using the client and web applications. We 
determined that a forensic practitioner investigating CloudMe cloud application should pay attention to the 
cache database, web caches, and log and configuration files, as highlighted in TABLE IV. Unlike cloud 
applications such as BitTorrent Sync [27] and Symform [29],  the CloudMe client applications did not 
create any identifying information (e.g., configuration file and cache folder) in the sync folders; hence, a 
practitioner cannot identify the sync directories from the directory listing. This also indicates that the cache 
database is a critical source of evidence for the synchronization metadata and cloud transaction records, and 
hence should not be overlooked. 
Analysis of the mobile clients determined that the findings were not as conclusive in comparison with the 
desktop clients, and only the viewed files could be recovered. This indicated that the iOS and Android 
mobile clients are merely a UI for the web application. Our examination of the web browsing activities 
identified unique URLs that can aid in identification of the user actions made to the web application, such 
as login, logout, and accessing and downloading sync files/folders. Although the application layer was fully 
encrypted (using HTTPS), we were able to recover the root directory for the web application from the web 
browser’s caches unencrypted, which included viewed files and metadata files and OpenSearch documents 
for the sync files/folders that contain the timestamp information and sharing passwords for the sync 
folders/files. However, a practitioner should note that the availability of the cached items depends on the 
API requests made to the web application; hence, the artefacts may not be consistent across different 
occasions.  
Our analysis of the physical memory captures revealed that the memory dumps may provide potential for 
alternative methods for recovering applications cache, logs, configuration files and other files of forensic 
interest. It was also possible to recover the folder sharing password from the web cache in plain text, but 
not for the login password. This suggested that a practitioner can only obtain the login password from the 
mobile clients, using WebBrowserPassView when manually saved in the web browsers, through an offline 
brute-force technique, or directly from the user. However, it should be emphasized that the data in physical 
memory may be overwritten on low memory and system’s shut down [16]. Therefore, obtaining the 
memory snapshot as quickly as possible increases the likelihood of preserving the artefacts. 
 We suggest future work extend this study to other popular and contemporary cloud storage services to 
provide further understanding of the big data artefacts from different cloud deployment models, which 
could lay the foundation for the development of data reduction techniques (e.g., data mining and 
intelligence analysis) for these technologies [79], [80]. 
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TABLE I 
TOOLS PREPARED FOR SYNCANY FORENSICS 
Tools Usage 
FTK Imager Version 3.2.0.0 To create a forensic image of the .VMDK files. 
dd version 1.3.4-1 To produce a bit-for-bit image of the .VMEM files. 
Autopsy 3.1.1 To produce directory listings for the forensic images as well as extracting files and analysing the 
Windows Registry, swap file/partition, and unallocated space from the forensic images. 
HxD Version 1.7.7.0 To conduct keyword searches in the forensic images. 
Volatility 2.4 To extract the running processes and network information from the physical memory dumps, as well 
as dumping files from the memory space of the CloudMe client applications (i.e., using the ‘pslist’, 
‘netstat’/’netscan’, and ‘memdump’ functions). 
SQLite Browser Version 3.4.0 and SQLite 
Forensic Explorer version  
To view the contents of SQLite database files. 
Photorec 7.0 To data carve the forensic images. 
File juicer 4.45 To extract files from files. 
BrowsingHistoryView v.1.60 To analyse the web browsing history. 
Nirsoft Web Browser Passview v1.58 To recover the credential details stored in web browsers. 
Nirsoft cache viewer, ChromeCacheView 
1.56, MozillaCacheView 1.62, 
IECacheView 1.53 
To analyse the web browsing caches. 
Thumbcacheviewer Version 1.0.2.7 To examine the Windows thumbnail cache. 
Windows Event Viewer Version 1.0 To view the Windows event logs. 
Console Version 10.10 (543) To view log files. 
Windows File Analyser 2.6.0.0 To analyse the Windows prefetch and link files. 
NTFS Log Tracker To parse and analyse the $LogFile, $MFT, and $UsnJrnl New Technology File System (NTFS) files. 
Plist Explorer v1.0 To examine the contents of the Apple Property List (PLIST) files. 
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TABLE II 
TABLES AND TABLE COLUMNS OF FORENSIC INTERESTS FROM CACHE.DB 
Table Table Column Relevance 
user_table user_id A unique numerical user ID for the user(s) logged in from the local device. This ID could assist a 
practitioner in correlating any user-specific data that might have been obtained from other sources 
of evidence. 
 username Username provided by the user during registration. 
 devicename Device name provided by the user during registration. 
 created Holds the addition time of the user account(s) in datetime format. 
syncfolder_table owner Owner’s ID which correlates with the ‘user_id’ table column of the ‘user_table’ table. 
 name Folder name. 
 local_path Local directory path. 
 cloud_path Server’s directory path. 
 folder_id A unique numeric folder ID for the sync folder(s). 
 created Folder creation date in datetime format 
 last_run Last sync time in datetime format. 
 inactivated Folder has been inactivated; ‘true’ if yes, ‘false’ if no. 
 encrypted Folder has been encrypted; ‘true’ if yes, ‘false’ if no. 
Syncfolder_folder_table name Folder name which correlates with the ‘name’ table column of the ‘syncfolder_table’ table. 
 root_folder_id Folder ID for the root sync folder, which correlates with the ‘folder_id’ table column of the 
‘syncfolder_table’ table. 
 folder_id Folder ID for the sync folder(s), including the folder ID for the subfolder(s). 
 child_folder_id A unique numeric folder ID for the subfolder(s) associated with the sync folder(s). The root folder 
retains its original folder ID unchanged. 
 creation_date Folder creation time in datetime format. 
 deleted Folder has been deleted; NULL if not deleted. 
 owner Owner’s ID for the sync folder(s), which correlates with the ‘user_id’ table column of ‘ user_table’ 
table. 
syncfolder_document_table owner Owner’s ID for the sync folder(s), which correlates with the ‘user_id’ table column of ‘ user_table’ 
table. 
 name Folder name. 
 root_folder_id Folder ID for the root sync folder. 
 folder_id Folder ID for the sync folder(s), including the folder ID for the subfolder(s), which correlates with 
the ‘child_folder_id’ table column of the ‘syncfolder_folder_table’ table. 
 document_id A unique numeric document ID for the sync file(s). 
 size File size. 
 modified_date Last modified date in datetime format. 
 checksum MD5 checksum for the modified document. 
 main_checksum MD5 checksum for the original document. 
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TABLE III 
TABLE FIELDS OF FORENSIC INTEREST FROM THE DB.SDB DATABASE. 
Table Table column Relevance 
files _id A unique numerical user ID used to identify a CloudMe sync file. 
 name Filename for the sync file. 
 folder_id Folder ID for the folder housing the sync file. 
 size File size for the sync file. 
 href URL to the sync file. 
 published Sync file addition time in datetime format. 
 updated Last updated time of sync file in datetime format. 
 owner Owner’s name of the sync file. 
 Mime Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (MIME) format of the sync file. 
folders Owner Owner’s name of the sync folder. 
 Folder_id A unique numerical user ID used to identify a CloudMe sync folder. 
 Name Folder’s name. 
 Parent Folder’s name for the parent folder. 
 Is_root Whether the sync folder is a root folder? 
 Path Original directory path for the sync folder.  
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TABLE IV 
LOCATIONS OF FILES OF FORENSIC INTEREST FROM CLOUDME 
Content Directory Paths 
Database  Cache.db database in %AppData%\Local\CloudMe\, /home/<User Profile>/.local/share/CloudMe/, 
/Users/<User Profile>/Library/Application Support/CloudMe/, and %<Universally Unique Identifier (UUID) for the 
CloudMe iOS app>%/Library/Caches/com.xcerion.icloud.iphone/nsurlcache/of the Windows, Ubuntu, Mac OS, and iOS 
clients. 
 /storage/sdcard0/Android/data/com.xcerion.android/cache/db.sdb on the Android client. 
Log files  [Year-Month-Day].txt in %AppData%\Local\CloudMe\logs\, /home/<User Profile>/.local/share/CloudMe/logs/, 
/Users/<User Profile>/Library/Application Support/CloudMe/logs/, and  of the Windows, Ubuntu, and Mac OS clients. 
Default 
download 
directory 
 %Users%\[User Profile]\Documents\, /home/[User Profile]/Documents/, /User/[User Profile]/Documents/, %<Universally 
Unique Identifier (UUID) for the CloudMe iOS app>%/Documents\persistentCache\, and 
/storage/sdcard0/Android/data/com.xcerion.android/cache/files/Downloads/ on the Windows, Ubuntu, Mac OS, iOS, and 
Android clients. 
Configuration 
files 
 HKEY_USERS\<SID>\Software\CloudMe registry key, /home/<User Profile>/.config/CloudMe/Sync.conf, /Users/<User 
Profile>/Library/Preferences/com.CloudMe.Sync.plist, %<Universally Unique Identifier (UUID) for the CloudMe iOS 
app>%/Library/Preferences/com.xcerion.icloud.iphone.plist, and %com.excerion.android%/shared_prefs/user_data.xml 
files on the Windows, Ubuntu, Mac OS, iOS, and Android clients. 
Web caches  www.cloudme.com/v1 directory of the web application. 
 
